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SHAWN R. KEITH, ) Appellant Case No. 20040328-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Case No. 025501031 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
There does not appear to be any issue that jurisdiction is proper and 
appropriate before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (195' • 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Then (actual issues in dispute whether presented as 
statements of the case or the facts. The parties agree to the facls as ,< l h HHi ni 
Appellant's brief with the additional provisions set forth in Appellee's brief and as 
both parties ajjree Hie sei loitti in the record by stipulated facts in the hearing of 
January 13th, 2003, see hearing transcript of that diy .ii i>.iq<»s ;H 't3 lid urn 167. 
Moreover, the State does not dispute preservation of the issue for appeal. 
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III. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS 
POINT NO. 1 
ALLOWING ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE WITHOUT CERTIFYING THE 
OPERATOR INVITES AN ATTACK UPON THE ESTABLISHED STANDARDS 
FOR ADMINISTRATION AND INTERPRETATION OF CHEMICAL ANALYSIS 
AS PROVIDED THROUGH THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. 
The arguments presented by Appellee at first blush appear reasonable. 
Surely this case can be no different than the circumstances in Salt Lake City v. 
Emerson, 861 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1993) where the officer failed to complete a 
separate checklist after a third breath test or retain the results of the two (2) prior 
failed tests. The omission violated the standards set by the Department of Public 
Safety. The difference is that in the Emerson case the officer was certified and the 
issue for review involved the proper use of the Intoxilizer 5000. Expert testimony in 
that case was helpful and the manner of noncompliance was one not likely to be 
exploited. Retracing the steps of the officer in his procedure and assessing whether 
or not that procedure was adequately followed as measured by the response of the 
machine was sensible and reliable to determine whether the machine was 
functioning properly or the procedure followed correctly. The problem in applying that 
approach to the certification of officers is that it rewards the misconduct of the officer 
in not maintaining certification, subjects the procedure to exploitation of 
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noncompliance and undermines the regulatory scheme contemplated by statute, rule 
and the Department of Public Safety. Once an officer has completed his initial 
training, been certified and operated the instrument in question for the first period of 
certification, he will unquestionably have all of the education, experience and training 
necessary to be established as an expert for trial purposes in any DUI case as 
assessed by the criteria of the Utah Rules of Evidence under Rule 702. The officer 
would be qualified to render his or her opinion both as to operation of the Intoxilizer 
5000 and the results. If the Court recognizes such qualification by experience 
without certification, it is reasonable to assume that such an alternative would be 
exploited by officers at the time of their recertification in nearly every district court 
in the State, and the renewal provisions will no longer be viewed as necessary. In 
fact, it only follows that the more time an officer has properly operated the Intoxilizer 
5000 the more likely it is that he will be recognized as an expert by his experience 
in the field and proportionately it will be of diminishing significance whether the 
officer was ever recertified. In fact, by implementing the procedure considered by 
the State one effectively eliminates the need for renewal certification eventhough it 
is found to be a fundamental part of subsection D of R 714-500-6. What need is 
there to renew certification when one can presume that a Utah district court will 
recognize expertise as an admissible alternative to render an opinion upon the 
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proper operation or use of the intoxilizer? It is even more disconcerting when one 
considers the fact that in the instant case the so called expert testimony was elicited 
from the one not certified, leading one to question why the trial court did not find the 
testimony unreliable because it was so self serving. In fact, the Court surprisingly 
saw no significant credibility concern in the officer's testimony even though the 
evidence at hearing established the same officer had lied about the issue of not 
being certified at a previous hearing. 
The experience-trumpts-certification argument could be applied to one driving 
without a driver's license, practicing law or some other profession without a license 
or even handling food in a restaurant without a food handler's permit. Certainly, 
experience under any of those circumstances would be just as reliable for 
admissibility purposes. The statutory mandate to the Commissioner of the 
Department of Public Safety was to establish and administer uniform and reliable 
standards and these have been promulgated into the form adopted as Rule 714 -
500-6. Subsection A states clearly that all breath alcohol testing operators ... must 
be certified by the department. The language "unless the operator qualifies as an 
expert under Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence" or its contextual equivalent is no 
where to be found within the section. Allowing an exception to this part of the 
process undermines the regulatory scheme requiring certification and recertification. 
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Given the circumstance, the language found in Fuenninq v. Arizona. 680 P.2d 
121 (Aa 1983) by the Arizona Supreme Court seems prophetic in stating "nothing 
would defeat the legislative objective more rapidly than to permit the various 
jurisdictions in Arizona to go their own way, secure in the knowledge that a test 
made under a particular procedure would be admissible so long as they show the 
accuracy and reliability of their local methodology, notwithstanding that a different, 
accurate and reliable procedure used in the adjoining town would have produced a 
different result in an otherwise identical situation." Id at page 133. 
The Arizona Supreme Court saw the matter as one of uniform minimum 
standards and read their provisions pari materia. It viewed the practice of utilizing 
alternatives to the established standards as prospectively too risky, leading to the 
possibility of finding one guilty in one case but innocent in another based upon 
varying standards, practices, operations or procedures. The Utah courts should be 
no less vigilant in establishing uniform objective minimum standards and not 
allowing exception that would defeat the purpose of the regulatory scheme. Applying 
an alternative means of admissibility under the Rules of Evidence by an uncertified 
operator substantially reduces the conforming basis of inherent reliability upon which 
the standard is predicated. 
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POINT NO. 2 
EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO ADOPT ALTERNATIVE RELIABILITY 
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EVIDENCE. THAT SIMPLY NO 
PRESUMPTION AROSE FOR LACK OF COMPLYING WITH STATUTORY 
PROCEDURE. THE POSITION SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO APPLY TO 
THE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF OFFICERS. 
The Appellant believes that the application of Rule 702, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, may be an appropriate alternative for admitting evidence in similar 
circumstances where the evidence would otherwise be found to not satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 714-500-5 and 6 regarding scientific testing if the same is 
helpful to the trier of fact, reliable by objective standards and not subject to 
exploitation. Certainly, when the issue is one of whether or not the instrument is 
functioning properly, expert testimony could be helpful to establish its proper 
operation, use and function. 
The cases cited by Appellee show circumstances where the application of an 
alternative admissibility exception would not undermine the regulatory scheme. In 
State v. Garcia. 965 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1998), the circumstances were very much 
like those of State v. Emerson, in that they both involved situations where the 
operating officer performed the testing procedure correctly but recorded the results 
incorrectly. In Murrav City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), the issue of 
trustworthiness was directed toward the machine. Officer certification was a given 
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assumption in the assessment of each of those cases. In State v. Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), the issue concerned expertise in a different field, child 
psychology and behavior, which Appellant views as being a different matter but still 
finds it hard to assume that certification or its equivalent, licensing in the discipline, 
would not have been scrutinized severely for admissibility purposes no matter what 
experience a particular child psychologist may have had. Moreover, as to the issue 
of inherent reliability, the Appellant feels that any assessment made by the trial court 
should be suspect in determining adequate foundation; that is, the proper application 
of scientific principles or techniques to the facts of this case by one qualified. See 
footnote 7, at page 398. However, to apply this position to include certification would 
only serve to undermine the entire established process and calls into question the 
fundamental purpose of the statutory scheme. If the testing results are to be treated 
as reliable and the testing procedures acceptable, there must be no exception to the 
certification process of those operating the equipment, see State v. Bishop. 957 P.2d 
369 (Kansas, 1998). There is no compelling reason in this case to deviate from that 
important uniform minimum standard. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above and in Appellant's brief, 
he requests that the matter be reversed and that Appellant's motion to suppress be 
granted and such other and further relief as appears equitable and proper. 
DATED thi&3fi& day of H ^ 20 05 . 
# 
J. BRYANTACKSON, 
Attorney for Appellant Keith 
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